



# Executive Summary

## INTRODUCTION

**Private messaging platforms like WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram have become an integral part of our day-to-day lives and yet much of what is shared remains private when compared with open forums on the internet.**

We know that these private messaging platforms have a profound impact on our digital behavior and emotional well-being, yet it is hard to step back and see the forest for the trees given their ubiquitous nature. While these platforms play an essential role in securing our privacy, they also expose users to a range of risks that undermine their sense of security and trust. This undermining of trust can affect their perceptions of peer platform users, corporations and even governments. We each have our own personal and evolving opinions about how private messaging platforms can be made more trustworthy based on our lived experience, whether through better design choices, more comprehensible policies or more transparent governance models.



*"I no longer go by my old name, just because the internet is a place. You can't search me by my documented name, it's a decision I made long ago. Also weary about sharing photos and geotagging, I no longer post often as I used to. I try to keep my face hidden to strangers and mostly identifiable to family."*



*"I follow up with a phone conversation and see how true it is or go online to verify that story before I choose to re-broadcast it. But in some cases, many people don't verify, they just repost and repost and it causes panic and in a few hours they find out it's fake."*



*"Sometimes, especially when counseling, the information shared (with me) is very sensitive. For instance, if you are doing counseling and you (message someone that they) should separate from their husband, this (message) is sensitive and you need security."*

## FINDINGS

**Since these markets are distinct and individual journeys within private messaging platforms are personal, there is always a risk of generalization when attempting to summarize this sort of user experience research. Nonetheless, there are some common patterns that seem to transcend these differences:**

**A// We found that people across very different markets have become incredibly sophisticated in how they understand and navigate the intricacies of these platforms.**

Across geographies, most users have built up fairly complex ways of engaging and adapting to risks and concerns as they perceive them (for ex: switching into airplane mode so that other users won't be able to tell if they have read their messages). This finding in particular calls into question the assumption that people are not likely to adjust their preferences even if these options were made more easily accessible. Even with insufficient features, people are finding a myriad of workarounds to address gaps and minimize shortcomings.

**B// Heightened perception of risk generally arises in response to specific situations, not all of which can be attributed entirely to the platform providers themselves.**

The risks that are most top of mind vary by market (e.g., in Nigeria, it was fraud. In the US, it was corporate surveillance). While private messaging platforms are responsible for some of the vulnerabilities and design gaps which make the risks more likely to materialize into harm, some factors leading to risks – for instance, cultural norms or existence of bad actors – are not fully preventable by messaging service providers. Still, because platform design and governance can enable and exacerbate these harms, platform providers have a responsibility

to both understand them and take steps to mitigate them. Given these complexities, users generally do not have a full understanding of where to direct or who to attribute their concerns to. Often, they take on a sense of responsibility for themselves ("I should have known better") so their response choices bear little connection to the risk itself, and tend to fade over time. Regardless, perceptions of trust in messaging platforms change rapidly and irreversibly in response to these acute situations.

Over the course of ten weeks, our team engaged a total of 185 diverse participants from Colombia, Nigeria and the US. While we have drawn our own conclusions in this report, **we hope that this research can serve as a resource to many different stakeholders as they consider ways that the design of these platforms can be improved, including:**

**1 // Platform owners and providers:** To negotiate competing product priorities and adjust product planning to address user concerns and diminishing perceptions of trust within messaging experiences.

**2 // Policymakers:** To better assess the risks that matter to residents and citizens related to security, democracy, and information integrity, understand and prioritize the harms that occur on private messaging platforms, and inform meaningful policy solutions.

**3 // Advocacy, Civil society:** To buffer advocacy efforts with data points and anecdotal evidence of the harms a diverse set of global users experience on private messaging platforms and examples of concrete changes that could improve trustworthiness.

**4 // Researchers:** To equip the trust and safety research field with actionable user-centered data, and offer a blueprint for mixed methods methodologies focused on user experiences of private messaging platforms. Researchers have the opportunity to replicate this approach in other markets and with other communities to further quantify these harms.

**5 // UX designers:** To augment their own user research and data analytics, and influence product priorities in line with user trustworthiness.

**6 // Platform value chain players & governments offering services on private messaging platforms:** To assess the potential impact of user concerns on the trustworthiness of services they offer on private messaging platforms. User perceptions of private messaging platform trustworthiness will shape their trust in services offered by governments and other value chain players on private messaging platforms, as we have seen during the pandemic. A lack of trust will likely lead to less engagement with both the messaging platforms and corresponding services offered on top.

to both understand them and take steps to mitigate them. Given these complexities, users generally do not have a full understanding of where to direct or who to attribute their concerns to. Often, they take on a sense of responsibility for themselves ("I should have known better") so their response choices bear little connection to the risk itself, and tend to fade over time. Regardless, perceptions of trust in messaging platforms change rapidly and irreversibly in response to these acute situations.

**C// Users also face a huge gap in terms of recourse and redress, which is a critical element of trustworthiness.**

The platforms themselves do not offer many clear affordances for seeking redress, particularly affordances that do not come with some reciprocal social costs (flagging another person's bad behavior or misinformation often leaves users more vulnerable to harassment).

**D// Most users do not feel that they have real choice and can "venue-shop" based on personal preferences.**

Even those with heightened awareness (human rights activists, for example) or high levels of technical knowledge find it practically challenging to avoid defaulting to the most common and pervasive platforms (WhatsApp in most cases). Because of this, choice alone cannot be held up as the silver bullet for ensuring better practices in the messaging platform market. While it's critical that new entrants prioritize trustworthy and safe platform design, existing platforms also need to take user concerns seriously and commit to enhancing trustworthiness with, inter alia, their design choices.

## APPROACH

The user experience of platforms like WhatsApp have become second nature to users in Colombia, Nigeria and the US. The design choices of platform providers are something users work around every day, sometimes unaware of how they shape both their personal behavior and that of others, as well as their very expectations of what private messaging platforms can and should be. **Human-Centered Design (HCD) approaches help us to make apparent dynamics and behaviors that are latent or under the surface.**

For this reason, it was critical that we take a participatory, Human-Centered Design (HCD) approach to pierce this veil and bring forward the voices and cross-cutting concerns of private messaging platform users. What risks are they most aware of when using messaging platforms? Where and how do these risks show up in their day-to-day behavior? Who do they hold responsible, and do they feel that they have any opportunity for recourse or redress? What choices and tradeoffs are they comfortable making to safeguard their data privacy and security and where do they feel powerless?

To gain insight into these questions, our team engaged a total of 185 participants over the course of 10 weeks. We met with ecosystem experts from several countries in the context of co-creation workshops, and community leaders and platform users in 1-on-1 and small group discussions in Colombia, Nigeria and the US.

All sessions were conducted remotely due to COVID-19 except for the community-led sessions. A breakdown of our research is as follows:



### Colombia

#### 50 total participants,

- 10 in depth 1:1 remote sessions,
- 9 remote small group discussions,
- 31 in person interviews led by community leaders



### Nigeria

#### 64 total participants,

- 10 in depth 1:1 remote sessions,
- 4 remote small group discussions,
- 42 in person interviews led by community leaders



### USA

#### 54 total participants,

- 10 in depth 1:1 remote sessions,
- 4 remote small group discussions,
- 32 in person interviews led by community leaders

## CONCLUSION

**There is much that private messaging platform providers can do differently if they choose to prioritize trustworthiness in platform design. User choice is not a sufficient excuse to justify the current shortcomings. Our research suggested that few users feel that they have real choice in the market despite the availability of multiple private messaging platforms.**

Pointing to the retention and engagement of users as a sign that they are satisfied with current interaction models and tradeoffs does not ring true. We heard consistently that the tradeoffs of leaving a dominant environment, – WhatsApp in most cases, – are incredibly daunting for all users, even the most security-conscious like human rights activists. Platform providers have a long way to go in bettering the design of their services, (though we are seeing discrete instances of intentional trustworthy design with recent changes by WhatsApp that allow users to leave group chats without alerting others, for example). We would also encourage private messaging service providers to be transparent in how they engage users in regular cycles of feedback using the sort of methods we employed for our research study – not just analyze user data behind closed walls.

**The dialogue around trustworthiness has remained at a theoretical level for too long.** We hope these findings will help those advocating for change (whether policymakers, researchers or activists) point to real and concrete design choices that can increase

## REPORT CONTENTS

In such opaque and highly personal environments, how might we better understand opportunities to intervene to address a set of common concerns? What would a better experience look like? To fill in that picture, this report breaks down what we heard into the following areas of analysis:

→ **EXPERIENCES:** It is critical to first contextualize these findings within a holistic view of people's everyday experiences and patterns of behavior on private messaging platforms. This report shares three sets of representative experiences from each market we looked at as a way of highlighting commonalities and differences from user perspectives.

→ **HARMS:** We identified the key risks leading to various harms that are most important to users across the three markets and are likely to have the biggest impact on their sense of trustworthiness. Any future design improvements should start by prioritizing the risks that are most important to the users themselves.

→ **GAPS:** The lack of mental models (other than text messaging) for how private messaging platforms work creates many gaps for users as they navigate risks and experiences of harm. Users lack supporting resources to evaluate and attribute their growing sense of concern. Who should they trust (their group admin? WhatsApp customer support?) when they encounter these gaps? In most cases the platforms provide few paths to recourse in the moment and little to no feedback to understand how their concerns might be resolved.

→ **DESIGN OPPORTUNITIES:** What can design really accomplish to minimize these risks, fill in these gaps and build trust once it is lost? Our research identified many pressing concerns regarding trustworthiness related to common elements of private messaging platform design, such as: group dynamics, misinformation and generalized anxiety relating to mental health. In each case, it is not hard to begin to see a path to provide users with better tools to manage risk and make informed choices – a number of which we illustrate with sample designs that were prototyped and tested with users to further inspire change. These designs are not prescriptive: they are meant to be representative of how a private messaging platform provider MIGHT address a specific gap or design opportunity. We recognize that any design changes are likely to come with tradeoffs and potentially impact business goals related to customer growth and engagement. **Some key areas where users responded most positively to potential design improvements include:**

- **Securing and/or modifying account information**
- **Providing accessible & tailored security & privacy controls**
- **Providing support mechanisms & emergency controls**
- **Improving verification & permission mechanisms**
- **Improving administrative & management tools**

trustworthiness on private messaging platforms. We also hope this research offers stakeholders a provocation to consider more fundamental changes to the environments in which these platforms operate, whether it be business models or interoperability standards. In that sense, these recommendations are complementary to a number of related initiatives for fighting disinformation and dangerous speech on private messaging platforms – including research, technical partnerships, dialogue and convening with policymakers and technology leaders, and public advocacy – and should be seen as an integrated part of this broader effort.

**The most distinctive outputs of this study – concrete, user-informed design recommendations – are just a starting point.** To some, our design recommendations might seem incremental in the face of the scale and severity of user risks and concerns experienced on private messaging platforms. These recommendations do not point to a comprehensive end state which, if implemented, would satisfy all user needs and address all experiences of harm. Instead, the design recommendations in this report can provide a path towards beginning to address these harms if they are implemented within a user-centered and iterative process. They can help pave the way for a more trustworthy messaging future.

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# 01 About



# Project overview

**“ I no longer go by my old name, just because the internet is a s— place. you can't search me by my document name, it's a decision I made long ago. Also weary about sharing photos and geotagging, I no longer post often as I used to. I try to keep my face hidden to strangers and mostly identifiable to family.”**

In the digital realm, end-to-end private messaging plays an important role in upholding individual rights to privacy and free speech. Platforms like WhatsApp and Signal allow residents to communicate with each other without the fear of governments, advertisers, or even snooping family members listening in or moderating the content of their communication. But these digital environments are not without many harms that undermine end user trustworthiness. Given their widespread adoption, it is critical that platform providers prioritize design choices that strengthen, not undermine, trust. That sounds great in principle, but where should they turn for guidance?

***The goal of this report is to share design opportunities that address harms that exist on private messaging apps and matter the most to a globally diverse selection of individuals. These design opportunities aim to enhance individual experience to provide a safer and secure messaging environment.***

What is at stake? For participants, private messaging can deliver offensive and inappropriate content, it can channel disinformation and “fake news”, and it can be used by nefarious actors to defraud unsophisticated or unsuspecting individuals. For example, our research reveals the rampant cases of hacking and scamming in both Nigeria and Colombia leading participants to look for alternative options (e.g., 3<sup>rd</sup> party apps) to protecting their accounts and verifying unknown contacts, even though these 3<sup>rd</sup> party apps compromise their privacy and security.

Platform providers may be tempted to view widespread adoption and high levels of engagement by individuals and groups as a reason to feel confident in current design choices. But our research participants are deeply concerned about their level of dependence on messaging services and their lack of control over the experiences within these messaging environments. Encryption alone does not confer a sense of safety and security, as it is poorly understood by almost everyone we spoke with. Participants are unsure of whom to trust – even scrutinizing the statements and reported behavior of senior executives like Mark Zuckerberg (Meta Platforms) or Pavel Durov (Telegram Messenger) as proxies for the relative integrity of WhatsApp or Telegram. It is only by investing in more effective and better-informed design choices that providers can help individuals and groups manage the risks inherent in these platforms; and work together to create chat environments that are safe, supportive and responsive to our changing needs.

This research looked to surface and test a preliminary set of design solutions that are likely to reduce the deleterious potential of private messaging platforms. As civil society organizations continue to push for more responsible technology, we hope our findings can be used by private messaging providers and other third-party players to build on the emerging ideas and test and implement potential solutions. While we do not expect our work to be the end-point in designing the right answer, we do hope it is an important step in that direction.

# 02 Country Insights



# Country insights



Through our in-depth one-on-one sessions and small group discussions with participants in Nigeria, Colombia and the United States, we identified three main user archetypes in each country to communicate important individual preferences, behaviors and practices when using private messaging apps. These archetypes are by no means comprehensive, however, they highlight some important factors which can be used as a foundation to explore relevant gaps in addressing individual needs.

Below is a breakdown of the archetypes for each of the three countries:

## Nigeria



### 1. Authoritative Admin

This archetype comprises administrators who are trusted by group members, seen as a point of authority and expected to resolve most group issues. This soft power, along with the ability on private messaging apps to add and remove participants; review and remove content; as well as make key decisions about group interactions and content that is allowed, empowers them to become dominant figures.



### 2. Citizen Journalist

This archetype comprises individuals who heavily depend on private messaging apps to share critical public/emergency information with others and to highlight important events that are unfolding and may not be available on mainstream media channels.



### 3. Low Tech Influencers

This archetype comprises traditional influencers (e.g., religious/community leaders) who typically rely on physical interactions with followers but are now moving their engagements/interactions to digital platforms for ease and wider reach.

## United States



### 1. Advantaged Activist

This archetype comprises individuals who use private messaging apps for social and political activism. This group tends to have access to important support structures for information, and safer privacy and security practices, as well as the availability of different private messaging app options for more safer and private communications.



### 2. Globe Trotter

This archetype comprises individuals who conduct frequent international communications across multiple private messaging platforms (e.g., frequent travelers, international students).



### 3. Ceremonial Admin

This archetype comprises individuals who are admins in groups of larger than 100. They are viewed as regular members by other group participants and usually not expected to moderate interactions or make key group decisions (e.g., removal and reviewing of content).

## Colombia



### 1. Concerned Activist

This archetype comprises activists in Colombia who have limited alternatives to dominant private messaging apps, and face increasing risks due to their activism and limited safety options (e.g., legal protection, effective safety practices) to leverage in order to counter growing risks (e.g., surveillance, hacking etc).



### 2. At Risk Adolescent

This archetype comprises individuals who are below legal adult age or who have recently become adults. This group faces particular challenges due to their susceptibility, and limited awareness/knowledge of risks as well as limited safety options to mitigate these risks.



### 3. Low Tech Entrepreneur

This archetype comprises entrepreneurs (e.g., transport service, plumbing) who have started to significantly leverage private messaging apps for communications and operations but have limited know-how of how to effectively use private messaging platforms to safeguard their businesses from hacking while maximizing communications.

# United States



## The American Context

The US has a population of 331 million people as of 2020<sup>1</sup>, of which around 72% accessed the internet through mobile devices as of 2021<sup>2</sup>. American society is shaped by a strong libertarian streak, with individual privacy and freedom being highly valued by the participants we spoke with. The behaviors and experiences that surfaced in our research suggested a stronger individualistic mindset relative to Nigeria or Colombia. US participants tended to believe that they should look after themselves and their immediate families or friends while relying less on authorities and the broader community for support<sup>3</sup>.

**This belief system plays a significant role in individuals' mental models, adoption and usage of private messaging apps, with the majority of participants more strongly believing that autonomy and digital privacy should be a fundamental right than we heard in Nigeria or Colombia.** For instance, based on our observations, admins are not seen as similarly strong authority figures with absolute decision-making powers in group spaces. Flagging of content and participants by admins is perceived as violating freedom of speech by a number of our US participants. Anonymity is also more valued over identification and verification than what we heard from participants from other markets.

Currently, WhatsApp with over 25 million subscribers, has a much larger market share in the US than Telegram and Signal. From our observations, many conversations on private messaging platforms tend to happen via P2P as opposed to groups. In group spaces, most participants we spoke with were reluctant to cede more control to admins and responded more positively to distributed decision-making approaches that might apply to all members.

## Adoption and usage of messaging apps in the US

Many of the participants we spoke with from the United States used a mix of private messaging apps to communicate with family, friends and colleagues, with some individuals using 3-5 messaging apps concurrently. Although very privacy-oriented, participants tend to use 1-2 trusted messaging apps to reduce their exposure to risks. The adoption and usage of private messaging apps by participants was driven by:

- Social/current trends
- Popularity of a private messaging app among individuals circles
- Privacy and security options
- Level of encryption
- Values and missions of private messaging app founders

**Their primary uses of private messaging app included:**

- Communicating with friends and family in and outside the country
- Socializing with family and friends
- Business communications and large group interactions
- Planning and organizing rallies and community initiatives

### RELATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

#### Private Messaging App Market

Monopolistic N C U Oligopolistic

#### Values Driving Individual Decision-Making

Individualist U N C Collectivist

#### Decision-Making in Groups

Distributed Power U C N Hierarchical Power

## Perceptions and concerns about privacy and security

The participants in the US that we spoke with were very concerned about their privacy. The level of concern varied depending on the individual, although most of them generally agreed that the privacy of individuals should be a basic expectation. We observed that many participants distrust messaging apps that have a clear commercial objective (e.g., selling ads). They see these apps as having an incentive to infringe upon individuals' privacy. To a large extent, privacy and safety in communications is perceived as an individual responsibility (e.g., being aware of risks and taking necessary steps) because privacy and security is believed not to be 100% guaranteed on all platforms. Other privacy and concerns raised by participants include:

- Government surveillance
- Monitoring of conversations for targeted ads
- Physical access of accounts by government operatives
- Spies in group chats
- Anonymity/access to personal information

## Representative user archetypes in the US

The participants we interviewed in the US exhibited a higher degree of diversity than our Colombian or Nigerian participants regarding their mental models, usage behaviors and choice of private messaging apps. This is likely influenced by migration patterns, cultural and political beliefs as well as the less dominant role that a platform like Whatsapp plays in day-to-day life in the US relative to the other markets. We selected three user archetypes that best represent different behavioral and social influencing factors to the adoption and usage of private messaging apps that emerged from our US research.



### Advantaged Activist

This archetype comprises individuals who use private messaging apps for social and political activism. This group tends to have access to important support structures for information, and safer privacy and security practices, as well as the availability of different private messaging app options for more safer and private communications.



### Globe Trotter

This archetype comprises individuals who conduct frequent international communications across multiple private messaging platforms (e.g., frequent travelers, international students).



### Ceremonial Admin

This archetype comprises individuals who are admins in groups of larger than 100. They are viewed as regular members by other group participants and usually not expected to moderate interactions or make key group decisions (e.g., removal and reviewing of content).

# Advantaged Activist

## Meet Jake

Jake is passionate about championing the rights of others and driving positive change in his community through community mobilization and peaceful activism.



## Jake's story

Jake is a 25-year-old artist and community mobilizer living in Florida. He works closely with community members to champion their rights and seek justice when necessary. Due to the nature of his work, he has become a target of local authorities and other community members. He is very careful and takes extra precautions when communicating or sharing information that is sensitive with others. He admits that technology has made it easy to connect with others, especially like-minded people, but he is also concerned about leaving a trail of evidence that can be used against him by others, especially those in positions of power.

“A password in this day and age feels rudimentary, because if someone really wants to, they can still access your account.”

“I no longer go by my old name, just because the internet is a s— place. You can't search for me by my legal name, it's a decision I made a long time ago. I try to keep my face hidden to strangers and mostly identifiable by family.”

Jake is extremely cautious with his mobile devices and seeks to hide his personal information whenever he uses private messaging apps. He believes that mobile devices can easily be used to eavesdrop, monitor movements and community gatherings by authorities. Although he uses several messaging apps to keep in touch with family and friends, Jake only uses one app that he trusts [Signal] to receive and share sensitive/confidential information. He especially sees the advances in surveillance technology by government operatives as being a serious threat to his personal safety.

### Challenges & concerns

Jake is extremely distrustful of communication devices/platforms. He generally prefers to do things in person and away from devices. However, this is not possible all the time and he is forced to use digital messaging platforms regularly. So he always takes extreme safety precautions with private messaging apps.

### Related Global Harms

- Vulnerability to hacking, scamming, blackmailing, extortion, fraud, and harassment
- Vulnerability to manipulation (misleading content, mis/disinformation) or exposure to offensive content

### ABOUT JAKE

#### Conforming to groups

(e.g., thinking, practices)

LOW

#### Comfort with technology

(e.g., use of private messaging platforms)

HIGH

#### Privacy & security vulnerability

HIGH

#### Perceived exposure to risks

HIGH

### Needs

Due to increased surveillance and sophistication of tools used to surveil, Jake would like to see changes not only in pro-privacy/security features but also policies that push for standardizing and upholding individual privacy and security on all messaging apps. He strongly believes that individual privacy should be a fundamental right when using digital apps.

### Related Global Design Opportunities

- Providing support mechanisms & emergency controls (e.g., blocking personal accounts remotely)
- Improving verification & permission mechanisms (e.g., enhanced permissions especially for location services)
- Securing personal data & account information (e.g., better tools that support anonymity of individuals)
- Providing accessible & tailored security & privacy controls (e.g., tailored privacy options)

# Globe Trotter

## Meet Jennifer

Jennifer is an experienced interior designer passionate about traveling the world, having new experiences and making new friends. She actively communicates on several platforms with contacts across the globe for business & social reasons.



## Jennifer's story

Jennifer is an interior designer and loves to travel the world. She has friends across continents whom she keeps in touch with often. She also manages many groups on private messaging apps that stretch across different time zones and continents. She uses several platforms in order to stay in touch with all of her contacts. She often uses WhatsApp because many of her contacts are on it, but she prefers to use Signal because it's simple and has fewer distractions.

“I mainly use these platforms for personal communications. I am open to the opposites person's preference because I don't really mind [regarding messaging apps]”


“When I was in Bali I connected with some people on WhatsApp there, and when I got back to Sweden, Facebook tried to connect me to those people. Then I realized okay this is how it is connected together. This was not a coincidence.”

Jennifer finds it overwhelming to keep in touch with all of her contacts across several different platforms. It takes a lot of time and energy to respond to chats and keep up with group interactions. She sees organizing her contacts as one of the important challenges she faces, especially when it comes to separating business, personal and other connections. Even though she is not particularly worried about the privacy of her communications, Jennifer is still careful about sharing sensitive information over messaging apps and often prefers to either use email or Signal for such exchanges.

### ABOUT JENNIFER


#### Conforming to groups

(e.g., thinking, practices)




#### Comfort with technology


(e.g., use of private messaging platforms)



#### Privacy & security vulnerability



#### Perceived exposure to risks



### Challenges & concerns

Jennifer admits that she is not worried about her privacy because she has nothing to hide. She is mostly concerned with streamlining her communications and managing her contacts.

### Related Global Harms

- Vulnerability to adverse mental health impacts
- Vulnerability to encryption and data breaches via modified and third-party supporting platforms

### Needs

While she is generally happy with her private messaging app usage, Jennifer would prefer to streamline her experience by using fewer features – as she can barely keep up with all of the messaging apps she uses. She identified a few features that would help resolve some of the challenges she faces.


### Related Global Design Opportunities

- Improving administrative & management tools (e.g., contact management tools)
- Improving verification & permission mechanisms (e.g., group/contact permissions and verification)
- Providing accessible & tailored security & privacy controls (e.g., tailored contact / group privacy options)

# Ceremonial Admin

## Meet Kelly

Kelly manages several groups on different private messaging platforms and is often faced with many challenges when managing these groups. Even though she has access to some admin tools, she is generally unable to use them due to resistance by group members who believe control and management of groups should not belong to one person.



## Kelly's story

Kelly is a 34-year-old community manager and a customer service representative. She supports and manages multiple groups in different messaging applications on a daily basis for social and work purposes. Her choice of private messaging platforms is mainly influenced by popularity within her work and social circles and available features. She is less concerned about her privacy and security when using private messaging platforms so those features do not directly drive her decision-making process.

“On Telegram you can regulate the people who text you, who views your number and who calls you. Telegram has lots of people and maybe you don't want everyone to contact you.”

“Being in these groups means there's more notifications on your phone and more phone anxiety in general.”

Kelly admits that being a group admin is not as privileged as others might think, especially when you are the admin of several groups. Besides constant notifications and the demand to respond to urgent group matters, she does not feel recognized or appreciated as a voice of authority when it comes to group matters. Often members want more autonomy and democracy in decision-making in the group. She believes that more tools to help groups in planning, decision-making and reaching a consensus would be helpful to allow all group members to feel more involved in group management and governance.

### ABOUT KELLY

#### Conforming to groups

(e.g., thinking, practices)

HIGH

#### Comfort with technology

(e.g., use of private messaging platforms)

MODERATE

#### Privacy & security vulnerability

HIGH

#### Perceived exposure to risks

MODERATE

## Challenges & concerns

As an admin of several groups, Kelly deals with group flare-ups, misbehaviors and malicious links from time to time. She admits that it is usually difficult to resolve these issues as group members have differing opinions on the matter. So reaching a consensus becomes a problem.

## Related Global Harms

- Vulnerability to hacking, scamming, blackmailing, extortion, fraud, and harassment
- Vulnerability to manipulation (misleading content, mis/disinformation) or exposure to offensive content

## Needs

Kelly believes that an average admin role is very demanding and that it would help to have access to tools that can assist with managing conversations in a group. She would also welcome tools that might allow group members to play active roles in management and decision-making in groups.

## Related Global Design Opportunities

- Improving administrative & management tools (e.g., planning & polling tools)
- Improving verification & permission mechanisms (e.g., content/hyperlink verification)

Thank you

Dalberg

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